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Fracking Preemption Litigation 
 




Fracking is not a new technology, but it only recently 
came to the forefront of energy industry news. Fracking’s recent 
fame has been both positive and negative. Fracking proponents 
have lauded the economic and environmental benefits of the 
process. They cite the process’ ability to extract formerly 
inaccessible oil and natural gas, which reduces the U.S.’s demand 
for foreign oil and natural gas and reduces the use of coal. In 
contrast, fracking opponents state fracking damages the 
environment by diluting drinking water with harmful chemicals, 
generating emissions, and creating general nuisances for 
communities. They believe fracking’s harmful impacts clearly 
outweigh any benefits that arise from the process. Instead of 
having a uniform regulatory scheme for this controversial topic, 
the federal government, state governments, and municipal 
governments have created a mishmash of regulations, and much 
consternation and litigation have arisen from conflicts between 
state and municipal laws. This Note will explore the litigation 
currently in state courts, specifically West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Colorado, which will decide 
the future of fracking. This Note will also explain how the 
arguments in each case are essentially the same. After reviewing 
the pertinent litigation surrounding this issue, this Note proposes 
that a more centralized, comprehensive federal regime is the best 
regulatory option for fracking. 
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6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014) 296 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ............................................................................ 296 
II. Background ............................................................................ 301 
A. What It Is and How It Works ............................................. 301 
B. Consequences ..................................................................... 303 
1. Negative ........................................................................... 303 
2. Positive ............................................................................ 304 
C. Effect on the United States’ Energy Industry ................... 306 
D. Current Regulatory Scheme .............................................. 308 
1. Regulatory Overview ....................................................... 308 
2. Federal Regulation .......................................................... 309 
3. State Regulation .............................................................. 311 
4. Municipal Regulation ...................................................... 313 
III. Analysis and Discussion ...................................................... 315 
A. Preemption Litigation Overview........................................ 315 
B. Completed Preemption Cases ............................................ 315 
1. West Virginia ................................................................... 315 
2. Pennsylvania ................................................................... 318 
3. New York ......................................................................... 321 
C. Current Preemption Litigation .......................................... 325 
1. Ohio ................................................................................. 325 
2. Colorado ........................................................................... 328 
D. State and Energy Companies’ Interests and Arguments Are 
the Same ................................................................................. 330 
E. Municipalities’ Interests and Arguments Are the Same ... 332 
F. State and Energy Companies’ Argument Should Prevail . 333 
G. Increased Federal Regulation is the Answer .................... 335 




 The oil and natural gas industry’s recent use of hydraulic 
fracturing, commonly known as “fracking,”1 has generated both 
                                                             
1. See Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism: Support for an 
Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. 
& POL’Y 913, 919–21 (2011) (describing the process of fracking). 
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vast benefits and numerous headaches for the United States.2 
Fracking is not a new technology, but it only recently came to the 
forefront of energy industry news.3 Fracking’s recent fame has 
been both positive and negative.4 For example, proponents of 
fracking have lauded the economic and environmental benefits of 
the process.5 They cite its ability to extract formerly inaccessible 
oil and natural gas that could reduce the United States’ demand 
for foreign oil and natural gas and reduce its use of coal.6 
Opponents have alleged that fracking damages the environment 
by diluting drinking water with harmful chemicals, generating 
emissions, and creating nuisances for communities.7 They believe 
that fracking’s possible harmful impacts outweigh any of the 
benefits that arise from the process.8 Instead of a uniform 
regulatory scheme governing this controversial topic, the federal 
government, state governments, and municipal governments 
                                                             
2. See id. at 23–29 (explaining the impact fracking has had on the 
United States). 
3. See id. at 918–19 (describing the recent media attention given 
to fracking). 
4. See Jody Freeman & David Spence, Should the Federal 




495104578314302738867078.html (outlining both the negative and positive 
effects of fracking) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
5. See id. (noting that “[f]racking has the potential to help the 
U.S. achieve energy independence, boost the economy and reduce greenhouse-
gas pollution.”). 
6. See id. (stating that “[f]racking—short for hydraulic 
fracturing—involves injecting fluids into the ground to access hard-to-reach 
reserves of oil and natural gas, including shale gas, which the U.S. has in vast 
abundance but hasn’t been able to reach easily up to now.”). 
7. See id. (specifying that fracking “produces significant amounts 
of air pollution and methane, a potent greenhouse gas. It also generates 
wastewater, often containing toxic chemicals. At scale, fracking requires vast 
amounts of water, which can reduce regional supplies. And industrializing the 
countryside not only disturbs locals, it can harm habitat and wildlife.”). 
8. See Powers, supra note 1, at 924–25 (listing the documented 
risks of fracking, including groundwater pollution, toxic air emissions, chemical 
spills, roadway deterioration, and “destruction of ecologically sensitive habitat 
and the landscape”). 
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have created a mishmash of regulations that have led to litigation 
over conflicts between state and municipal laws.9 
Generally, individual states have widely endorsed 
fracking, and those states want to retain regulatory control of the 
industry.10 State legislatures feel that they are best suited to 
regulate fracking because they, unlike municipal governments, 
are intimately familiar with their respective state’s geology, 
economic development priorities, and legal regimes associated 
with property and leases.11 On the other hand, some 
municipalities disfavor fracking and have now begun banning 
it.12 Most municipalities are granted authority to protect their 
citizens from nuisances and to regulate the use of land through 
the enactment of zoning laws by way of their state constitutions, 
and municipalities analogize fracking to the nuisances from 
which they are allowed to protect their citizens.13  
Conflicts between state and local regulations have 
generated a considerable amount of litigation.14 State courts in 
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Colorado have 
been called upon to decide whether their state statutes regulating 
fracking preempt local legislative bans on the process.15 While the 
                                                             
9. See Jason Schumacher & Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal 
Landscape of “Fracking”: The Oil and Gas Industry’s Game-Changing Technique 
is its Biggest Hurdle, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 260–261 (2013) (describing 
fracking’s existing regulatory regime). 
10. See id. at 260–61 (stating that “[b]ecause of the many variables 
in local geology, economics, and so forth, there is a general consensus that 
regulation is best left to the states, where hydraulic fracturing is already a 
highly regulated activity.”). 
11. See id. at 260 (describing the critical components of fracking 
that are commonly regulated by states). 
12. See Timothy O’Connor & Joseph De Avila, Fracking Cases to 




009304579043250553113252.html (noting that “some cities, counties, and 
municipalities have begun to enact bans on hydraulic fracturing”) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
13. See id. (specifying the reasons for supporting municipal 
regulatory power). 
14. See id. (identifying conflicts between New York state and 
municipal governments). 
15. See e.g., Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 
13CV63, 2014 WL 3690665, at *14 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 24, 2014) (“Article XVI of 
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laws in each state and municipality differ, the arguments in each 
case are essentially the same.16 For proponents of state 
regulation, the argument boils down to state law creating a 
comprehensive regulatory system or granting the state sole 
regulatory authority.17 Thus, any municipal law restricting or 
                                                                                                                                             
the Longmont Municipal Charter, which bans hydraulic fracturing and the 
storage and disposal of hydraulic fracturing waste in the City of Longmont, is 
invalid as preempted by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act.”); Norse 
Energy Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) 
(stating that the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law “does not preempt, either 
expressly or impliedly, a municipality's power to enact a local zoning ordinance 
banning all activities related to the exploration for, and the production or 
storage of, natural gas and petroleum within its borders.”); State ex rel. 
Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (holding 
that certain drilling ordinances were in direct conflict with and preempted by a 
state law); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013) 
(finding that a statute restricting municipalities right to restrict fracking 
unconstitutional under the Environmental Rights Amendment); Ne. Natural 
Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *9 (W. 
Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (concluding that the State’s interest in oil and gas 
development and production justifies the West Virginia Department of 
Environmental Protection exclusively controlling this area of the law.). 
16. See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *2 
(describing how “owners of oil and gas interests [have] challenged regulations 
enacted by La Plata County, a statutory entity. The regulations stated purpose 
was to promote the health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity or 
general welfare of the present and future residents of La Plata County.”); see 
also State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 88 (noting that “the question to be 
answered is whether the City of Munroe Falls can enforce its ordinances 
governing oil and gas drilling and related zoning and rights-of-way issues 
despite the state’s comprehensive statutory scheme for drilling set forth in R.C. 
Chapter 1509.”). 
17. See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *2 (stating 
that “[t]he Bowen/Edwards plaintiffs claimed the Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act conferred exclusive authority on the Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission to regulate oil and gas activity throughout the state, 
thereby preempting the county regulations.”); see also Norse Energy, 964 
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (noting that “t]he supersession clause in the OGSML provides 
that ‘[t]he provisions of [ECL article 23] shall supersede all local laws or 
ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining 
industries’”); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (describing that the 
statute at issue states “this chapter and rules adopted under it constitute a 
comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling, well 
stimulation, completing, and operating of oil and gas wells within this state, 
including site construction and restoration, permitting related to those 
activities, and the disposal of wastes from those wells.”); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d 
at 913 (stating that the dispositive issue is the controlling source of legal 
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banning fracking would be in conflict with state law and 
preempted.18 For proponents of municipal regulation, the basic 
argument is that state constitutions grant municipalities power 
to adopt ordinances over local issues, and fracking is an issue of 
local concern because of its potential negative effects on local 
communities.19 As a result, municipal ordinances restricting or 
banning fracking are not preempted and should remain valid.20 
Although state and municipal legislatures should weigh 
fracking’s positive and negative consequences when enacting 
fracking laws, courts are not required to consider those policy 
concerns.21 The courts involved in this preemption litigation 
should focus on the constitutional preemption issues in each case, 
and the courts should conclude that each state’s fracking 
regulation preempts the municipal fracking bans.22 In addition, 
after reviewing the complexity of the existing fracking regulatory 
regime, it is evident that a comprehensive federal regulatory 
                                                                                                                                             
authority); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5–6 (outlining the pro-
state regulation argument). 
18. See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 
(concluding that the state agency regulates hydraulic fracturing); see also State 
ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (holding that “[t]he city, however, is 
permitted to enforce pertinent right-of-way ordinances in the face of the drilling 
activities, provided these ordinances are not enforced in a discriminatory 
manner against oil and gas well drilling.”); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d, at 913 
(finding that certain “provisions of Act 13 violate the Commonwealth’s duties as 
trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Environmental 
Rights Amendment”); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376 (holding that the 
state “regulations do not provide any exception or latitude to permit the City of 
Morgantown to impose a complete ban on fracking or to regulate oil and gas 
development and production.”). 
19. See Shaun A. Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing: 
Trends in State Preemption, HARVARD LAW BLOG (July 2012), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2013/03/Municipali
ties-and-Hydraulic-Fracturing-Trends-in-State-Preemption.pdf (explaining the 
pro-municipal regulation argument) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
20. See id. (stating the pro-municipal regulation conclusion). 
21. See id. (describing the legal conflicts at issue in preemption 
litigation). 
22. See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *2 (detailing 
pro-state regulation arguments). 
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regime involving minimal state regulation and no municipal 
regulation is much needed in the future.23 
 This Note will explore the complexity of the existing 
fracking regulatory regime, as well as the preemption litigation 
that has arisen between states and municipalities because of the 
convoluted regulatory system.24 Part II of this Note provides 
background information on how fracking works, the costs and 
benefits of fracking, and the structure of the existing regulatory 
regime.25 Part III analyzes the arguments in the completed and 
current cases dealing with preemption litigation arising from 
disputes between state fracking laws and municipal fracking 
bans.26 Part III ends with explanations of how the courts involved 
in current preemption litigation should rule in each case. This 
Note concludes with a discussion on the complexity and costliness 
of fracking’s existing regulatory system and provides potential 
alternative regulatory regimes that would minimize costs and 




A. What It Is and How It Works 
 
 Hydraulic-fracturing, also known as “fracking,” is a gas 
drilling and extraction technique involving “the injection of fluid 
into a well to cause subsurface formations to fracture and release 
natural gas.”27 Fracking is not a recently developed process.28 The 
process originated in the U.S. in the 1940s and has been 
continuously used for the last seven decades.29 It only recently 
                                                             
23. See Freeman, supra note 4 (listing arguments in support of 
federal regulation). 
24. See Colorado Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *1 
(listing current litigation concerning conflicting regulatory regimes). 
25. See Powers, supra note 1, at 919–21 (describing the process of 
fracking). 
26. See supra note 15 (listing current litigation concerning 
conflicting regulatory regimes). 
27. See Powers, supra note 1, at 919 (detailing the mechanics of 
the fracking process). 
28. See id. (stating that fracking was “[f]irst developed in the 
1940s”). 
29. See id. (“Hydraulic fracturing has been used throughout the 
country for about sixty years and in New York State since the 1950s.”). 
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became well known because of the discovery of the Marcellus 
Shale natural gas formation.30  
 To implement the fracking process, a well is drilled into 
bedrock creating what industry experts call a “wellbore,” after 
which acid is injected in the wellbore to eliminate any bacteria in 
the wellbore.31 A metal and concrete casing is then fitted into the 
wellbore and a mix of chemicals, commonly called “fracturing 
fluids,” is shot through the wellbore at high pressure to open or 
enlarge fractures in the geological formation.32 This process 
“allow[s] oil or natural gas to move more freely from the rock 
pores to production wells that bring the oil or gas to the 
surface.”33  
 The fracking fluid injected into the geological formations is 
typically composed of many different chemicals, but water and 
sand are the primary components.34 Typically, water and sand 
compose 99.5% of the fluid, and chemical additives compose the 
remaining 0.5%.35 Those additives include “chemical agents with 
anti-corrosive and anti-bacterial functions, many of which are 
highly toxic.”36  
After cracking the target geological formation, the 
fracturing fluids, or “flowback,” returns to the surface where it 
                                                             
30. See id. (describing that “[t]he first horizontal well in the East 
was drilled in Pennsylvania in 2003 to reach the gas-rich Marcellus shale 
formation, which underlies much of the Appalachian region.”). 
31. See id. at 920 (outlining the process of drilling a well, fitting 
the wellbore with steel and concrete casing, and pumping chemicals into the 
wellbore). 
32. See Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, UNITED 
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (May 9, 2012), [hereinafter EPA 
Fracking Background], 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydr
owhat.cfm (explaining the second step in the fracking process) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
33. Id. 
34. See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: 
UNLOCKING AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS RESOURCES 7 (July 2014), available at 
http://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-and-natural-gas/hydraulic-fracturing-
primer/hydraulic-fracturing-primer-2014-highres.pdf (“[f]racturing fluid is made 
up from 90% water, 9% sand and .5% chemicals) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
35. See id. (listing the chemical composition of fracturing fluids).  
36. See Powers, supra note 1, at 920. 
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can be stored.37 The flowback returns to the surface because the 
internal pressure of the formation forces the flowback up through 
the wellbore.38 Not all of the flowback rises back to the surface 
causing concerns over the potential “contaminat[ion] of 






 There are several alleged harms associated with 
fracking.40 The harms “range from quality of life issues, such as 
persistent noise and vibrations from drilling and underground 
injection, to health impacts from exposure to air and water 
pollutants, to property value destruction, to social disruption.”41  
 Specifically alleged quality of life issues include: erosion 
from construction and pipeline siting; noise and light pollution; 
increased truck traffic and roadway deterioration; and 
destruction of ecological habitats and the landscapes.42 Specific 
alleged health impact issues include: gas or fracking fluid 
contaminating groundwater; toxic air emissions from gas leaks; 
chemical spills; chemical fires and gas explosions; and improper 
disposal of toxic chemicals.43  
 Opponents primarily cite issues with water pollution 
because “[w]astewater treatment facilities are not always 
equipped to handle drilling waste.”44 Water pollution could arise 
from fracking fluid seeping through the targeted formations into 
water sources or runoff of flowback into surface or groundwater 
resources.45 Flowback can contaminate groundwater immediately 
                                                             
37. See EPA Fracking Background, supra note 32 (noting the 
effects of geological pressures on the fracking process).  
38. See Powers, supra note 1, at 920 (explaining the incidental 
results of fracking). 
39. Id. 
40. See Powers, supra note 1, at 924 (describing fracking’s 
potentially widespread negative consequences). 
41. Id. 
42. See id. (listing specific negative effects). 
43. See id. at 924–25 (outlining negative health effects). 
44. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 247. 
45. See id. at 244 (explaining potential negative effects on water 
supplies). 
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after expulsion from the wellbore or after leakage from 
containment pits dug in the ground.46 
Fracking proponents answer the seeping fracking fluid 
argument by citing studies that indicate, “migration of 
contaminants through up to a mile of rock into the water table is 
unlikely, though theoretically possible.”47 Fracking proponents 
respond to the flowback contamination threat by citing that 
regulators closely scrutinize management and disposal of 
fracking fluid.48 
The other most cited alleged negative consequences 
concerns emissions, land use, and seismic activity.49 Toxic air 
emissions primarily “stem from methane leaks originating from 
wells, and emissions from the diesel or natural gas-powered 
equipment such as compressors, drilling rigs, pumps, and so forth 
that are used in the process of constructing the well and 
extracting the gas.”50 
Land use issues primarily arise when fracking rigs are 
located near residential areas, and these troublesome situations 
have become prevalent due to the fracking of the Marcellus Shale 
formation.51 Recent seismic activity in areas where earthquakes 
usually do not occur has been linked to fracking because rigs are 





 Natural gas production from fracking can be “enormously 
profitable and bring . . . hard-to-resist economic benefits 
to . . . state[s].”53 Landowners with property rich in gas or oil 
                                                             
46. See id. at 246 (listing additional potential negative 
consequences on water supplies). 
47. See id. at 245–46 (describing counterarguments to the water 
dilution effect). 
48. See id. at 246 (presenting regulations in place to prevent water 
dilution). 
49. See id. at 251–53 (noting more, less well known, negative 
consequences). 
50. Id. at 251. 
51. See id. at 252 (describing potential land use issues).  
52. See id. at 252–53 (identifying the possibility of induced seismic 
activity).  
53. Powers, supra note 1, at 927. 
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typically lease their land to drillers and receive royalties and 
signing bonuses in return.54 Signing bonuses can be thousands of 
dollars, and royalties from one acre of leased land for one year 
can be six figures.55  
 Landowners are not the only citizens of states to benefit 
from fracking.56 Fracking can also generate job opportunities 
because the method is composed of several other processes.57 
According to estimates, “the natural gas industry is expected to 
create over 75,000 new jobs by 2020, provide $600 million in state 
revenue, as well as $270 million in local tax revenue” for 
Pennsylvania under the existing regulatory scheme.58 The 
Marcellus Shale formation under Pennsylvania is “estimated to 
be worth at least $500 billion.”59  
 IHS Global Insight, a data mining company focusing on 
the energy sector, determined that the development of shale gas 
via fracking could lead to lower household energy bills for 
consumers, thus creating additional disposable income.60 
Specifically, IHS Global Insight estimated that the “development 
of shale gas resources added $1,200 of disposable household 
income in 2012, and that amount could increase to more than 
$3,500 by 2025.”61  
  Natural gas also may be a viable alternative to the United 
States’ reliance on coal and oil and may significantly reduce the 
nation’s greenhouse gas emissions.62 The United States has 
                                                             
54. See id. at 927 (explaining positive effects for landowners). 
55. See id. (outlining exactly how much landowners can expect to 
receive from fracking leases). 
56. See id. (describing other positive effects). 
57. See id. (noting job growth as a positive result from fracking). 
58. Kristen Allen, Comment, The Big Fracking Deal: Marcellus 
Shale—Pennsylvania’s Untapped Re$ource, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 52 (2012). 
59. Id. 
60. See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SHALE ANSWERS, at slide 
5 (2013), available at 
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Hydraulic_Fracturing/Shale-Answers-
Brochure.pdf, (listing positive effects for everyday energy consumers) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
61. Id. 
62. See Joshua P. Dennis, Comment, The Emergence of Natural 
Gas and the Need for Cooperative Federalism to Address a Big “Fracking” 
Problem, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 253, 255 (2012) (illustrating how 
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significant natural gas reserves. 63 The Energy Information 
Administration in 2011 “estimated that the United States 
possesses approximately 2,552 TCF of potential natural gas 
resources, enough to supply the United States for approximately 
110 years.”64 TCF is an abbreviation for trillion cubic feet, and it 
is a common volume measurement of natural gas.65 Of that 2,552 
TCF, 862 TCF is technically recoverable shale gas.66 The 862 TCF 
makes the United States’ reserves the second largest in the 
world.67  
 
C. Effect on the United States’ Energy Industry 
 
 Fracking “has transformed America’s prospects as a 
hydrocarbons producer.”68 Fracking has increased both gas and 
oil output at least thirty percent since the mid 2000s.69 Fracking 
has also helped push the United States’ expected oil and gas 
production combined beyond that of any country in the world.70 
“Jobs in energy have nearly doubled in the United States since 
2005, . . . [and] North Dakota, which sits on the huge Bakken oil 
and gas field, now boasts an unemployment rate of just three 
                                                                                                                                             
natural gas could be used as a viable alternative energy source to help reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
63. See id. at 256 (describing the United States’ natural gas 
resources). 
64. Id. 
65. See Trillion Cubic Feet – TCF, INVESTOPEDIA, (last visited Dec. 
29, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trillion-cubic-feet.asp (noting the 
volume measurements for natural gas) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
66. See Dennis, supra note 62, at 256 (describing how much of the 
United States’ natural gas is recoverable). 
67. See id. (noting the United States’ rank compared to other 
nations’ amount of recoverable natural gas). 
68. From Sunset to New Dawn, THE ECONOMIST, (Nov. 16, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21589870-capitalists-not-just-greens-
are-now-questioning-how-significant-benefits-shale-gas-and (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
69. See id. (explaining the growth in extracted natural resources 
because of fracking). 
70. See id. (outlining the global effect fracking has had on the 
current natural gas and oil production hierarchy). 
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percent, the lowest among the states.”71 Natural gas prices 
“ha[ve] [also] fallen by two-thirds.”72  
 Various industry reports project that, within six to ten 
years, shale gas and oil will add between $380 billion and $690 
billion to the United States’ annual gross domestic product.73 The 
reports state that the drilling process itself will not be the only 
factor leading to this GDP growth.74 “[A]ll the other activities 
needed to produce and distribute the fuels . . . [are] being 
transformed too.”75 Gas-fired power stations are replacing coal-
fired stations in the electricity production sector, and this effect 
even reduced greenhouse-gas emissions from power generation in 
the United States between 2010 and 2012.76 Overall, “[t]he 
spending-power of . . . new workers [from incidental business 
growth], and the cut in businesses’ and households’ energy bills, 
should provide a broad boost to the economy.”77 
 With that said, cheap natural gas has pressed energy 
companies to move away from other forms of energy, like nuclear 
power.78 An executive at Exelon Corporation, a leading U.S. 
power generator, has said the recent natural gas trends have “not 
only made new nuclear plants unfeasible . . . but [have] 
undermined Exelon’s plans to upgrade its existing fleet.”79 In May 
of 2013, Duke Energy, another U.S. power generator, told the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), the federal agency that 
approves the construction of new nuclear power plants,80 that it 
                                                             
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See id. (noting potential future growth due to fracking). 
74. See id. (describing incidental growth). 
75. Id. 
76. See id. (listing further environmental benefits). 
77. Id. 
78. See Jeff McMahon, How Fracking Killed Nuclear Power, 
FORBES (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2013/06/16/fracking-not-wind-killed-
exelons-nuclear-upgrades/ (explaining how fracking has altered the whole 
energy sector) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
79. Id. 
80. See generally Organization & Functions, UNITED STATES 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/organization.html (providing functional descriptions for committees and 
offices of the NRC) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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would not be building two of the six originally planned reactors.81 
Yet another American power company, Dominion Resources, shut 
down one of its nuclear plants in May of 2013 “based purely on 
economics,” such as the falling price of natural gas.82 
 But as the United States pushes for alternative and 
renewable energy options, fracking appears to be an 
environmental middle ground because natural gas power plants 
“produce less air pollution than coal-burning plants.”83 
 
D. Current Regulatory Scheme 
 
1. Regulatory Overview 
 
 Fracking is highly regulated, but one governmental body 
does not regulate the entire industry.84 The fracking industry is 
regulated through a three-prong regime.85 The industry is 
governed on the federal level by administrative agencies 
including the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the 
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”), and the Department of Energy (“DOE”).86 Additionally, 
state agencies—such as the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (“PaDEP”) and the West Virginia 
Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”)—and local 
governments regulate the fracking industry.87 The three-part 
regulatory system exists because fracking has “many 
                                                             
81. See Fracked Off, THE ECONOMIST (May 30, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21578690-thanks-cheap-natural-
gas-americas-nuclear-renaissance-hold-fracked (noting specific energy 
companies changing strategies because of fracking) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
82. Id. 
83. NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS IN 
AMERICA’S ENERGY MIX, (June 2012), available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/energymixII.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
84. See Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 257–58 
(describing the complex regulatory scheme generally). 
85. See id. (outlining the existing regulatory scheme). 
86. See id. (elaborating on the federal part of the regulatory 
scheme). 
87. See id. at 284–94 (listing state agencies involved in fracking 
regulation). 
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variables . . . [including] local geology . . . [but also national] 
economics.”88 As federal, state, and municipal fracking 
regulations are spliced together, this regulatory regime is 
complex, convoluted, and costly.89 Consequently, some legal 
authors propose increasing federal regulation and centralizing all 
regulatory power on the federal level.90 
 
2. Federal Regulation 
 
 Although “there is no comprehensive regulatory scheme at 
the federal level,” the federal government does regulate key 
aspects of fracking.91 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
commonly known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), regulates 
surface water discharges and storm water runoff.92 The Safe 
Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) “regulates the disposal of fluid 
waste deep underground.”93 The EPA enacted its first 
comprehensive regulation of fracking emissions in 2012 using 
their authority from the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).94 The 
Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) requires drillers to report the use and 
release of certain hazardous chemicals into the environment.95 
Furthermore, “the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
requires permits and environmental impact assessments to be 
conducted prior to drilling.”96  
                                                             
88. Id. at 260. 
89. See Jason T. Gerken, Comment, What the Frack Shale We Do? 
A Proposed Environmental Regulatory Scheme for Hydraulic Fracturing, 41 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 81, 101–22 (2013) (explaining the many levels of regulation and how 
they relate). 
90. See id. at 128 (describing a potential regulatory scheme 
focused on the federal government). 
91. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 260. 
92. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (2012). 
93. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 261 (citing the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2012)). 
94. The Clean Air Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
95. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
96. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 263 (citing the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)). 
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 In addition to those statutes, the EPA and BLM may 
control more aspects of the fracking process in the near future.97 
In 2011, “the EPA announced plans . . . to initiate a rulemaking 
under the Toxic Substances Control Act98 regarding disclosure of 
chemicals used in the drilling process.”99 The BLM has drafted an 
initial set of rules solely for fracking on public land, but a final 
set of rules has not been issued.100  
Several agencies provide additional oversight of fracking 
activity.101 The EPA has previously conducted and continues to 
conduct studies of water quality issues related to fracking.102 
These studies are likely in response to the primary issue 
opponents of fracking cite when discussing the process’s alleged 
negative consequences. The BLM also issues permits for drilling 
on federal land and has designed a plan for “a new automated 
system designed to track permit applications through the entire 
review process and quickly flag missing or incomplete 
information, permitting time delays are expected to be greatly 
reduced.”103 
The DOE oversees the fracking industry because it 
controls the approval of natural gas exportation.104 The DOE 
determines if domestically produced natural gas should be 
exported overseas.105 “[P]olicymakers are concerned about the 
long-term effects of natural gas exports on domestic supplies and 
price,” so the DOE is hesitant to allow exportation.106 
The DOE allows exportation across the board “to countries 
with which the U.S. has a Free Trade 
                                                             
97. See id. at 263–64 (explaining proposed regulations).  
98. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–92 
(2012). 
99. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 263 (citing Letter 
from Stephen A. Owens, Assistant Administrator, Environmental Protection 
Agency, to Deborah Goldberg, Earthjustice (Nov. 23, 2011) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT)). 
100. See id. at 264 (outlining a possible addition to the regulatory 
regime, but specifying the addition has not been finalized). 
101. See id. at 264–74 (describing that there is vast federal 
oversight). 
102. See id. at 264–65 (noting studies currently being conducted to 
determine fracking’s safety). 
103. Id. at 269. 
104. See id. at 271 (describing the DOE’s indirect regulatory power). 
105. See id. (explaining the DOE’s natural gas job). 
106. Id. 
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Agreement (“FTA”) . . . [because those actions are] ‘consistent 
with the public interest,’” but the DOE requires a case-by-case 
determination on whether exportation to a non-FTA country is 
consistent with the public interest.107 “That public-interest 
determination can involve a number of factors including the 
short- and long-term effects on U.S. energy markets, supplies, 
and price.”108 
 
3. State Regulation 
 
 There are many more federal regulations and federal 
agencies that have a role in the regulatory process, but “as with 
oil and gas drilling overall, hydraulic fracturing regulation is 
inherently local” because states regulate the key aspects of the 
process and impose additional rules.109 
 
States have broad powers to regulate, permit and 
enforce the drilling and fracture of the well, 
production and operations, management and 
disposal of wastes, and abandonment and plugging 
of the well, . . . [and] [s]tate laws generally give an 
agency or director of state oil and gas operations 
discretion to require whatever is necessary to 
protect human health and the environment.110  
 
 Pennsylvania’s oil and gas regulations specifically mention 
fracking and restrictions imposed on it, which is atypical. 
Pennsylvania even has regulations specifically addressing 
fracking the Marcellus Shale.111 The Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (“PaDEP”) oversees all applications to 
conduct hydraulic fracturing operations in Pennsylvania.112 The 
                                                             
107. Id.  
108. Id. at 272. 
109. Id. at 260. 
110. Dennis, supra note 62, at 269. 
111. See generally, 25 PA. CODE § 78.1 (2014) (defining several terms 
relate to fracking including “Marcellus Shale well”); 25 PA. CODE § 78.121 
(outlining reporting requirements for Marcellus Shale wells).  
112. See 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3211 (2012) (listing the 
requirements to obtain well permits, which are issued by “the department”); 58 
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applications to PaDEP require information about the proposed 
site and the surrounding land, including “the proposed location of 
the well and ‘the name of all surface landowners or water 
purveyors whose water supplies are within 1,000 feet of the 
proposed well location,’” to protect the state’s citizens and 
surrounding environment from any potential harm.113 
If fracking taints a water supply, PaDEP will assume the 
well operator liable if the well is within 1,000 feet of a water 
supply and “the pollution occurred six months after completion of 
drilling or alteration” to the well.114 Pennsylvania also requires 
each well operator list the chemicals in its fracking fluid, the 
wastes generated from the process, and the methods for cleanup, 
disposal, and waste management.115 Like the studies conducted 
by the EPA, the required disclosures and presumptions are likely 
a direct answer to concerns fracking opponents have about water 
quality in fracking areas.116 
 Colorado has more stringent regulations than the federal 
government in an attempt to protect its water resources.117 
Colorado created an agency called the Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (“COGCC”) in the 1970s through 
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act whose purpose is to 
regulate oil and gas development.118 The COGCC regulations 
require: establishing protection zones around streams that 
provide drinking water supplies; reporting the chemicals used in 
any fracking operations; consultation with state and wildlife 
officials on fracking applications; and cleaning up of a well site 
after fracking is completed.119 Colorado restricts oil and gas 
development near homes and schools because of concern over the 
                                                                                                                                             
PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (2012) (defining “Department” as “The 
Department of Environmental Protection of the Commonwealth”). 
113. 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3211(b)(1) (2012). 
114. See 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3218 (outlining ways in which 
Pennsylvania’s water supplies will be protected from fracking). 
115. See 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1 (2012) (listing the 
disclosure requirements for unconventional hydraulic fracturing); 25 PA. CODE § 
78.55 (2014) (requiring a waste management plan). 
116. Id. 
117. See Dennis, supra note 62, at 267 (describing Colorado’s state 
regulations). 
118. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-100 (creating the COGCC). 
119. See Colo. Code Regs. § 404-1 (creating regulations under the 
COGCC) 
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health of children.120 Finally, “[a]ll [oil and gas] development 
proposals require landowner notification and public comment 
periods.”121 
 New York issued a temporary moratorium on fracking in 
August of 2010, pending the outcome of a groundwater 
contamination study by the New York Department of 
Environmental Conservation (“NYDEC”),122 but the moratorium 
will continue as New York’s Assembly recently approved a two-
year ban on the process.123 If the moratorium is lifted at some 
point in the future, New York already has regulations dealing 
with the energy industry’s water use.124 
 While not a complete description of every state’s 
regulatory regime, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and New York’s 
regulations provide a wide array of state fracking regulations. 
Most states have some form of fracking regulation, and many try 
to provide a comprehensive set of rules to reduce the alleged 
dangers for its citizens and landscape.125 Those states that do not 
have regulatory rules specifically addressing fracking, like New 
York, are studying the impacts of the process before allowing the 
industry to move forward.126  
 
4. Municipal Regulation 
 
                                                             
120. See id., § 404-1:604 (restricting development near “high 
occupancy buildings,” defined as homes and schools, among others.” 
121. Dennis, supra note 62, at 267. 
122. See Mireya Navarro, N.Y. Assembly Approves Fracking 
Moratorium, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/n-y-assembly-approves-fracking-
moratorium/ (stating the issuance of the temporary moratorium) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
123. See Freeman Klopott, New York Assembly Approves Two-Year 
Moratorium on Fracking, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/new-york-assembly-approves-two-
year-moratorium-on-fracking.html (noting New York’s continuing fight with 
fracking) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
124. See Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 280 (listing New 
York’s potential fracking regulations). 
125. See id. (describing state regulations overall). 
126. See id. at 281–82 (explaining why some state’s do not have 
regulations). 
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 In response to the possibility of having oil derricks placed 
in small towns, local municipalities across the U.S. have begun to 
ban fracking on the municipal level because of its potential 
negative consequences.127 Towns along the Marcellus Shale 
formation have been the most vehement in their anti-fracking 
campaigns. Morgantown, West Virginia; Dryden, New York; 
Robinson, Pennsylvania; and Munroe Falls, Ohio have each 
enacted bans against fracking or zoning ordinances severely 
restricting fracking.128 Some cities not on the Marcellus Shale 
have also enacted fracking limitations.129 For example, 
Longmont, Colorado banned fracking altogether.130 Each city 
believes it can enact these bans because they have legal authority 
to care for its citizens’ and environment’s health and well-
being.131 
 Limitations set by municipalities often conflict with state 
laws, so legal preemption issues tend to dominate state courts.132 
State regulators and energy companies assert towns, like the 
ones listed above, cannot create moratoriums on fracking because 
the states issuing fracking permits have oil and gas development 
laws already in place.133 Thus, it is argued that any municipal 
fracking law would be preempted.134 Some municipalities 
disagree with that argument because states grant municipalities 
police power and the power to create zoning laws specifically 
tailored to protect their citizenry and environment.135  
                                                             
127. See id. at 284 (outlining municipal responses to state fracking 
permitting). 
128. See Goho, supra note 19 (listing specific towns embroiled in 
litigation over their local fracking restrictions). 
129. See id. (explaining towns across the country restrict fracking). 
130. See Shippen Howe, Of Counsel, Van Ness Feldman LLP, 
Speaker at the Energy Bar Association Conference: Round II - Legal and 
Regulatory Issues Associated with Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil and Gas Shale 
Formations (Oct. 2, 2013), PowerPoint Slide 53 (listing a specific town in 
Colorado that banned fracking) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
131. See Goho, supra note 19 (describing the basic argument towns 
make in support of their local ordinances). 
132. See id. (noting litigation because of the differing laws). 
133. See id. (stating the state’s basic argument against municipal 
restrictions). 
134. See id. (explaining the result states and energy companies 
hope for). 
135. See id. (listing the municipalities’ basic argument). 
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III. Analysis and Discussion 
 
A. Preemption Litigation Overview 
 
 Three states, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, 
have completed their legal preemption litigation, and two states, 
Ohio, and Colorado, have preemption litigation currently pending 
in their state courts.136 Although the basic arguments are the 
same in every case, it is important to understand the varying 
facts of each case. The facts include how each party became 
involved in the litigation and the exact language of each state’s 
and each municipality’s fracking legislation. The language of the 
regulations in each state sparking the preemption litigation 
varies greatly, and the language is key because the 
comprehensiveness of each state’s and each municipality’s laws 
may determine the outcome of the pending cases. 
 
B. Completed Preemption Cases 
 




 West Virginia is one of three states to have completed its 
preemption litigation.137 In Northeast Natural Energy, LLC v. The 
City of Morgantown, the Circuit Court of West Virginia, Division 
No. 1, Monongalia County, analyzed whether West Virginia’s oil 
and gas exploration laws,138 as promulgated by West Virginia’s 
Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”), preempted 
a municipal ordinance completely banning fracking139 in 
                                                             
136. See id. (outlining the states involved in preemption litigation). 
137. See id. (describing the facts of West Virginia’s legal preemption 
case). 
138. See W.VA. CODE § 22-1-1, 6 (2014).  
139. MORGANTOWN, W.VA., ORDINANCE 721.01-.03, available at 
http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Frack_Actions_MorgantownWV-
ban.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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Morgantown.140 The court held that West Virginia’s state law 
preempted Morgantown’s fracking ban.141 
 
Facts and Arguments 
 
 In 2011, Northeast Natural Energy, LLC (“Northeast”) 
entered into a lease agreement for an industrial park just outside 
the corporate limits of Morgantown, West Virginia, and the lease 
agreement gave Northeast the right to drill, develop, and extract 
natural gas under the property.142 Subsequently, WVDEP issued 
permits to Northeast allowing it to drill on the site.143 After the 
permit issuance, the City of Morgantown enacted its ban on 
fracking.144 Because of the ordinance, Northeast would have been 
unable to drill. Northeast challenged the ban hoping to preclude 
its enforcement.145 Northeast contended that WVDEP’s oil and 
gas exploration laws, which were enacted years before 
Morgantown’s ban, preempted Morgantown’s fracking 
ordinance.146  
West Virginia’s oil and gas laws declare that “[t]he state 
has the primary responsibility for protecting the environment; 
other governmental entities, public and private organizations and 
our citizens have the primary responsibility of supporting the 
state in its role as protector of the environment.”147 The laws also 
state that the purpose of the WVDEP is to “consolidate 
environmental regulatory programs in a single state agency, while 
also providing a comprehensive program for the conservation, 
protection, exploration, development, enjoyment and use of the 
natural resources of the state of West Virginia.”148 Lastly, the 
laws declare that the state shall “[p]erform all duties as the 
                                                             
140. See Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-
411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5–9 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (explaining the 
details behind West Virginia’s preemption litigation). 
141. See id. at *10 (noting the holding in the case). 
142. See id. at *1 (describing Northeast’s interest in the litigation). 
143. See id. at *3 (elaborating on Northeast’s permitting process). 
144. See id. (explaining Morgantown’s response to the permit issued 
to Northeast). 
145. See id. at *1 (noting the initial legal action taken by 
Northeast). 
146. See id. (outlining Northeast’s basic argument). 
147. W. VA. CODE § 22-1-1 (2014) (emphasis added). 
148. Id. 
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permit issuing authority . . . in all matters pertaining to the 
exploration, development, production, storage and recovery of 
this state's oil and gas.”149 Northeast asserted that the State 
controlled fracking regulation because the State had a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme in place.150 Thus, no local 
ordinances contravening the state fracking law, like 
Morgantown’s, were permitted.151 
Morgantown completely banned fracking within the city 
limits and within one mile of the corporate city limits.152 The 
city’s ordinance states: 
 
It is hereby found that the drilling for oil and gas is 
an activity which adversely impacts the 
environment, interferes with the rights of the 
citizens in the enjoyment of their property, and has 
the potential for adversely affecting the health, well 
being and safety of persons living and working in 
and around areas where drilling operations exist.153 
 
The ordinance also specifically refers to fracking as a process 
with: 
 
[A]n increased level of potential harm which 
includes, but may not be limited to, contamination 
of ground water and hazards associated with the 
storage, treatment and transportation of the water 
or other liquids after being used in the 
process . . . [that] may impact the citizens, drinking 
water, and property within the City of 
Morgantown.154  
 
Morgantown contended that it had the right to enact the ban 
because there was a “Home Rule for Municipalities” within the 
                                                             
149. Id. § 22-6-2 (2014) (emphasis added). 
150. See Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *7 (describing 
why Northeast believes it should prevail). 
151. See id. (explaining Northeast’s desired result). 
152. See MORGANTOWN, W. VA., ORDINANCE 721.01-.03 (noting the 
purpose of Morgantown’s ordinance). 
153. Id. at .01(emphasis added). 
154. Id. (emphasis added). 
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West Virginia Constitution.155 Morgantown asserted that the 
“Home Rule” gave the city the right to self-governance in 
municipal matters including regulating nuisances for the 
protection of its citizens, and the city likened fracking to a 




The Court agreed with Northeast and declared the 
Morgantown fracking ban invalid.157 The ban was invalid because 
the state already had comprehensive oil and gas exploration 
regulations, so any local fracking regulation was preempted.158 
Under West Virginia law, an appeal must be filed within four 
months of a court’s holding.159 Morgantown did not appeal within 
that time frame.160 This case finalized West Virginia’s fracking 
preemption litigation, and no more fracking preemption litigation 






 Pennsylvania has also completed its fracking preemption 
litigation.161 In Robinson Township, Washington County v. 
Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed 
                                                             
155. See Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *2 (stating what 
Morgantown argues is the basis for its authority to enact and enforce the 
ordinance); see also W.VA. CODE § 8-12-2 (1969) (granting “Home rule power for 
all cities”). 
156. See Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *2 (noting 
Morgantown’s specific reasoning underlying its argument).  
157. See id. at *10 (describing the outcome in West Virginia’s 
preemption litigation). 
158. See id. (identifying the West Virginia court’s reasoning). 
159.  See W. VA. CODE § 58-5-4 (2014) (describing the amount of time 
allotted to file an appeal of a circuit court decision). 
160  See Goho, supra note 19, at 4 (addressing the fact that West 
Virginia did not appeal the Court’s decision). 
161. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 915 (2013) 
(listing Pennsylvania as a state with fracking preemption litigation). 
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whether an amendment to the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act162 
violated the authority granted to Pennsylvanian municipalities to 
protect the well-being of their citizens163 in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.164 This is the rare case where a town did not enact 
an ordinance before litigating the issue. The Court held that the 
amendment to Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act violated the 
state’s constitution and cities may impose municipal fracking 
restrictions.165  
 
Facts and Arguments 
 
 In February 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature added 
provisions to the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act.166 These 
revisions included restricting prohibitive local oil and gas 
regulations and required uniformity among local oil and gas 
zoning ordinances.167 Pennsylvania’s amended Oil and Gas Act 
stated, “[e]nvironmental acts are of Statewide concern and, to the 
extent that they regulate oil and gas operations, occupy the entire 
field of regulation, to the exclusion of all local ordinances.”168 
In the following month, the citizens of Robinson sued 
requesting a declaration that the revisions to the Oil and Gas Act 
were unconstitutional because they wanted the ability to regulate 
fracking in the future.169 Robinson’s citizens contended that the 
revisions violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, specifically the 
“Environmental Rights Amendment.”170 The “Environmental 
Rights Amendment,” enacted in 1971, states: 
                                                             
162. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3303 (2014) (granting exclusive regulation 
of oil and gas industry to the state). 
163. PA. CONST. Art. 1., § 27 (2014) (outlining that natural resources 
belong to the people of the state). 
164. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913 (describing the litigation’s 
players in detail). 
165. See id. at 977 (describing Pennsylvania’s preemption litigation 
result). 
166. See id. at 901 (describing the initial step that led to the 
litigation). 
167. See id. at 903 (elaborating on what specific state law additions 
led to the litigation). 
168. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303 (2014). 
169. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 903 (2013) (explaining 
Robinson’s legal action against the state). 
170. See id. (listing Robinson’s basic argument). 
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[t]he people have a right to clean air, pure water, 
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment. 
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including 
generations yet to come. As trustee of these 
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.171  
 
Robinson asserted that the state cannot “remove necessary and 
reasonable authority from local governments to carry out these 
constitutional duties” through legislation like the 2012 
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act amendment.172 Robinson 
contended that the revisions “denie[d] municipalities the ability 
to carry out their constitutional obligation to protect public 
natural resources”173 under the Environmental Rights 
Amendment because they would not have the ability to regulate 
an industry that extracted public natural resources.174 Robinson 
declared that the constitutional command for municipalities to 
protect the environment limited the state’s police power.175 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania contended that the 
amended Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act preempted any municipal 
zoning ordinances enacted “to plan for environmental concerns 
for oil and gas operations” because the Oil and Gas Act 
“occup[ied] the entire field of regulation [(referring to oil and gas 




                                                             
171. PA. CONST. Art. 1., § 27 (2014). 
172. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 901 (outlining Robinson’s 
argument that the Pennsylvania constitution cannot be preempted by state 
statutes). 
173  Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 470 (2013). 
174. See id. (outlining arguments that the regulation interferes 
with the police powers granted under the Pennsylvania Constitution). 
175. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (describing Robinson’s 
general constitutional point). 
176. Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 470. 
FRACKING PREEMPTING LITIGATION 321 
 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sided with Robinson 
and ruled that the amended Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act 
violated Pennsylvania’s Constitution.177 Pennsylvania’s Supreme 
Court declared that the state’s police power could not disrupt a 
municipal regulation if the local law involves the fundamental 
power of respecting the city’s environment granted to 
municipalities in the state’s constitution.178 Pennsylvania’s 
Supreme Court’s handing down of this ruling completed 
Pennsylvania’s fracking preemption litigation.179 Following the 
ruling, Jordan Yeager, the attorney representing Robinson 
Township, lauded the decision and said, “[c]ommunities can now 
move forward to protect their residents” by enacting fracking 
bans and not having to worry about preemption litigation.180 
 




 New York completed its fracking preemption litigation in 
Summer 2014.181 The Court of Appeals analyzed whether the 
state’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law182 preempts a town 
zoning ordinance in Dryden banning all activities related to 
exploration, production, and storage of natural gas and 
petroleum.183  
 
                                                             
177. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977 (describing Pennsylvania’s 
preemption litigation result). 
178. See id. at 957 (outlining the Pennsylvania court’s reasoning). 
179. See id. (laying out the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion 
on the Pennsylvania statute). 
180. Kelly Knaub, Pa. Justices Won’t Reconsider Landmark 
Fracking Decision, LAW 360 (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/512396/pa-justices-won-t-reconsider-landmark-
fracking-decision (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
181. See Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1191 (N.Y. 
2014) (noting New York’s settled preemption litigation) . 
182. N.Y. ENERGY LAW §§ 23-0303[2]; 23-0101[20][c]; 23-0503[2] 
(McKinney 2013) (stating that it is in the public interest to regulate oil and gas). 
183. See Norse Energy Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
716 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (outlining the basic arguments in New York’s 
preemption litigation).  
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Facts and Arguments 
 
 In August 2011, the Town of Dryden in New York enacted 
a zoning ordinance that “ban[ned] all activities related to the 
exploration for, and the production or storage of, natural gas and 
petroleum” including fracking within the town.184 Soon thereafter 
Anschutz Exploration Corporation (“Anschutz”), a driller and 
developer of oil and natural gas wells with preexisting leases for 
land in Dryden, filed suit and sought a declaratory judgment that 
would invalidate the town’s ordinance.185 Anschutz lost at the 
lowest court level and then appealed to an intermediate appellate 
court.186 Anschutz also lost at the intermediate appellate level 
and immediately appealed to New York’s highest court. 
 Anschutz asserted that New York’s Oil, Gas, and Solution 
Mining Law (“OGSML”), enacted in the 1980’s, preempted 
Dryden’s recent zoning ordinance.187 New York’s OGSML declares 
that state law “shall supersede all local laws or ordinances 
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining 
industries.”188 New York’s OGSML also concerns the details and 
procedures of well spacing by drilling operators stating “[t]he 
[D]epartment [of Environmental Conservation] shall issue a 
permit to drill . . . if the proposed spacing unit 
submitted . . . conforms to statewide spacing and is of 
approximately uniform shape.”189 
Anschutz contended that the zoning ordinance was 
expressly preempted or, in the alternative, impliedly 
preempted.190 Anschutz believed expressed preemption applied 
because “the plain language of this provision prohibits 
municipalities from enacting laws or ordinances ‘relating to the 
                                                             
184. Id. at 716–18. 
185. See id. at 716 (outlining the initial fact that led to the 
preemption litigation). 
186. See Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1193 (explaining the procedural 
history of the case). 
187. See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S. 2d at 716 (noting the energy 
company’s basic argument). 
188. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 23-0303[2] (McKinney 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
189. Id. §§ 23-0101[20][c]; 23-0503[2] (emphasis added). 
190. See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718–23 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013) (listing the energy company’s specific arguments). 
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regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries.’”191 
Anschutz also believed implied preemption applied because “a 
‘local government . . . may not exercise its police power by 
adopting a local law inconsistent with constitutional or general 
law,’” and both the state law and the municipal law address and 
conflict on where drilling is to occur.192  
 Dryden contended that each town has “home rule powers,” 
granted to it through New York’s Municipal Home Rule Law,193 
which include the right to regulate land use through zoning 
ordinances in order to protect the environment.194 Dryden further 
asserted that its zoning ordinance did not “seek to regulate the 
details or procedure of the oil, gas and solution mining industries. 
Rather, it simply establishes permissible and prohibited uses of 
land within the Town for the purpose of regulating land 
generally.”195 
In its zoning ordinance, Dryden proclaimed that “[n]o land 
in the Town shall be used: to conduct any exploration for natural 
gas and/or petroleum; [or] to drill any well for natural gas and/or 
petroleum.”196 The zoning ordinance lists various potential 
dangers associated with natural gas exploration as its reasons for 
restricting exploration.197 Potential dangers to “the health, safety 
and general welfare of the community” including “deposit of 
toxins into the air, soil, water, environment, and in the bodies of 
residents.”198 The town clarified as well that: 
 
the Zoning Ordinance is not directed at the 
regulatory scheme for the operation of natural gas 
wells under ECL Article 23, it addresses land use 
                                                             
191. Id. at 719. 
192. Id. at 723. 
193. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(11) (McKinney 
2011) (describing the home rules powers granted to towns in New York). 
194. See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (explaining that 
“Among the powers delegated to local governments is the authority to regulate 
the use of land through the enactment of zoning laws.”). 
195. Id. at 719. 
196. See Dryden Ordinance, available at 
http://dryden.ny.us/Downloads/PROPOSED_AMENDMENTS_ZONING_ORDIN
ANCE.pdf (explaining prohibited uses for land in Dryden) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
197. See id. (describing the reasoning behind Dryden’s local ban). 
198. Id. 
6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014) 324 
and nuisance concerns and the protection of the 
health, safety and general welfare of the people of 
the Town of Dryden and the enhancement of its 
physical environment.199 
 
Thus, the town believed that while the ordinance may have an 
incidental effect on the fracking industry, New York’s OGSML 
did not preempt this zoning ordinance.200 Dryden also rebutted 
Anschutz’s implied preemption argument by explaining that the 
state law focused on the details and procedures of drilling while 
the municipal law addressed traditional land use zoning 
considerations.201 Thus, the two laws “do not conflict, but rather, 




 New York’s highest court agreed with Dryden.203 The court 
acknowledged in its opinion that this case involved “major policy 
questions for the coordinate branches of government to resolve[, 
but] the discrete issue before us . . . is whether the state 
legislature eliminated the home rule capacity of municipalities to 
pass zoning laws that exclude oil, gas and hydrofracking 
activities in order to preserve the existing character of their 
communities.”204 
The Court ruled that a reading of the plain language, 
legislative history, and the purpose and policy of New York’s 
OGSML did not lead the court to conclude that Dryden’s 
ordinance was expressly or impliedly preempted.205 “[I]n light of 
ECL 23–0303(2)'s plain language, its place within the OGSML's 
framework and the legislative background, we cannot say that 
                                                             
199. Id. (emphasis added). 
200. See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (explaining the city’s 
reasoning). 
201. See id. at 723 (presenting the city’s reasoning to the energy 
company’s alternative theory). 
202. Id. 
203. See Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1203 (N.Y. 
2014) (noting the New York Court of Appeals holding). 
204. Id. 
205. See id. at 1196–1203 (explaining the reasoning behind the New 
York court’s holding). 
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the supersession clause—added long before the current debate 
over high-volume hydrofracking and horizontal drilling ignited—
evinces a clear expression of preemptive intent.”206 More than 170 
towns in New York have passed bans or moratoria on fracking 
similar to Dryden’s ban, and those towns can now rest easy 
because New York’s highest court cemented their local 
regulations.207 
 






 Ohio has not completed its fracking preemption litigation, 
but the state’s highest court heard oral arguments over the issue 
in early 2014.208 The Ohio Supreme Court will determine if Ohio’s 
state law granting Ohio’s Department of Natural Resources sole 
regulation of gas and oil operations within the state209 preempts 
Munroe Falls’ drilling ordinance.210 
 
Facts and Arguments 
 
 In February 2011, Ohio’s Department of Natural 
Resources issued drilling permits to Beck Energy Corporation 
allowing the company to frack on property in Munroe Falls, 
Ohio.211 Soon after drilling began, the city sought an injunction to 
stop Beck Energy from drilling.212 “The city claimed Beck Energy 
                                                             
206. Id. at 1203. 
207. See id. stating that the ban “encourages the increasing number 
of communities across the country opting to place limits on the controversial 
practice.”). 
208. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 135 Ohio 
St.3d at 1469 (Ohio 2013) (noting the unresolved nature of Ohio’s fracking 
preemption litigation). 
209. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013) (explaining rules 
for the statewide regulation of oil and gas activities). 
210. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 
85, 97 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (elaborating on the issue in the case). 
211. See id. at 88 (describing the background leading to the case). 
212. See id. (noting the first legal step taken). 
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did not comply with its [local] ordinance requiring permits for 
drilling,” and a trial court granted the injunction.213 Beck Energy 
appealed the decision quickly to an intermediate appeals court, 
the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Summit County.214 
 Beck Energy contended that the city’s ordinance, enacted 
in 1980, directly conflicted with Ohio’s state oil and gas law, 
enacted in 1965.215 The state oil and gas law creates “in the 
department of natural resources the division of oil and gas 
resources management,”216 and declares that the division of oil 
and gas resources management has “sole and exclusive authority 
to regulate the permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas 
wells and production operations within the state, excepting only 
those activities regulated under federal laws for which oversight 
has been delegated to the environmental protection agency.”217 
The law further explains that: 
 
[t]he regulation of oil and gas activities is a matter 
of general statewide interest that requires uniform 
statewide regulation, and this chapter and rules 
adopted under it constitute a comprehensive plan 
with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling, 
well stimulation, completing, and operating of oil 
and gas wells within this state . . . .218 
 
The statute clarifies that “[n]othing in this section affects the 
authority granted to . . . local authorities . . . provided that the 
authority granted under those sections shall not be exercised in a 
manner that discriminates against, unfairly impedes, or obstructs 
oil and gas activities and operations regulated under this 
chapter.”219 Under the state law, the state has the sole and 
exclusive authority to regulate gas production operations within 
Ohio, and Beck Energy asserted that the existing city ordinances 
                                                             
213. Id. 
214. See id. (noting Beck Energy’s legal response). 
215. See id. at 91 (outlining generally the energy company’s 
argument). 
216. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013) 
217. Id. (emphasis added). 
218. Id. (emphasis added). 
219. Id. (emphasis added). 
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also attempted to regulate gas production operations.220 Thus, the 
state law preempted the city’s ordinance, and Beck Energy 
argued that it should be allowed to continue drilling.221 
 Munroe Falls, on the other hand, contended that the local 
ordinance was valid because “local municipalities have home-rule 
authority, under Section 3, Article XVIII of [the] Ohio 
Constitution, to regulate gas drilling operations.”222 Ohio’s 
Constitution states “[m]unicipalities shall have authority to 
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and 
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other 
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”223 
Munroe Falls’ drilling ordinance states that “[n]o . . . entity shall 
commence to drill a well for oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons within 
the corporate limits of the Municipality until such time as such 
persons have wholly complied with all provisions of this chapter 
and a conditional zoning certificate” issued by the city.224 The 
ordinance also requires that a public hearing be held for town 
citizens to voice their concerns and “the hearing . . . shall be 




 The Court of Appeals of Ohio agreed with Beck and 
declared Munroe Falls’ drilling ordinance invalid on preemption 
grounds because the state regulation’s wording gave the state 
sole oil and gas regulatory power.226 Munroe Falls then appealed 
the court’s ruling, and the Ohio Supreme Court granted appeal 
and heard oral arguments on February 26, 2014.227 A ruling is 
expected by Spring 2015. 
                                                             
220. See State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 91 (explaining the 
energy company’s reasoning).  
221. See id. (listing the energy company’s desired outcome). 
222. Id. at 92. 
223. OH. CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3. 
224. MUNROE FALLS, OH., ORDINANCE § 1329.03 (2012) (emphasis 
added). 
225. Id. (emphasis added). 
226. See State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–99 (explaining the 
outcome in Ohio’s preemption litigation). 
227. See Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio Justices Hear Local Drilling Rules 
Dispute, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/26/ohio-justices-to-hear-local-
 






 Colorado also has not finalized its fracking preemption 
litigation yet.228 The Colorado Oil & Gas Association (“COGA”), 
an oil and gas trade association, sought a declaratory judgment in 
Colorado District Court invalidating a resolution,229 which has 
the same legal power as an ordinance, enacted by the City of 
Longmont that banned fracking within the city limits.230 COGA 
asserted that the state’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act231 
preempted Longmont’s fracking ban.232  
 
Facts and Arguments 
 
 In November 2012, Longmont, Colorado enacted a 
resolution that prohibited fracking within the city limits.233 With 
the support of the state of Colorado, COGA filed suit seeking to 
invalidate the city resolution.234 The trade association filed suit 
on behalf of the state and many drillers with lease interests in 
Longmont.235 
                                                                                                                                             
drilling-rules-dispute/?page=all (discussing the status of Morrison) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
228. See Complaint at 1, Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n v. City of 
Longmont, Colo., available at http://ourlongmont.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/20121218_010338_COGAfiling.pdf (outlining the lack 
of finality in Colorado’s preemption litigation). 
229. Longmont, Co. Resolution R-2012-67 (2012), available at 
http://www.co.weld.co.us/assets/dD0d5d4aa3487776BC8D.pdf. 
230. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 
2014 WL 3690665, at *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. July 24, 2014) 
(explaining what the Colorado Oil and Gas Association wanted). 
231. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(a) (2013) (explaining the 
powers allocated to the commission). 
232. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at 1 (outlining 
the Colorado Oil and Gas Association’s basic preemption argument). 
233. See id. (noting the background leading to Colorado’s fracking 
preemption litigation) 
234. See id. (describing the first legal action taken). 
235. See id. at 2 (explaining the plaintiff’s interest in the case). 
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 COGA claimed that the city’s resolution directly opposed 
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, which was enacted 
decades before Longmont’s resolution, “because it prohibits oil 
and gas activity that the state permits.”236 Longmont’s Resolution 
“prohibit[ed] within the city of Longmont the use of hydraulic 
fracturing to extract oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons, and 
prohibit[ed] . . . the storage in open pits or disposal of solid or 
liquid wastes created in connection with the hydraulic fracturing 
process.”237 
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act created the 
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and vested it 
with the “authority to regulate [t]he drilling, producing, 
and . . . all other operations for the production of oil and gas.”238 
The purpose of the Commission regulating oil and gas operations 
is “to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental 
impacts on any air, water, soil, or biological resource resulting 
from oil and gas operations to the extent necessary to protect 
public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the 
environment and wildlife resources.”239 
 COGA asserted that this was an irreconcilable operational 
conflict that should result in the invalidation of the city 
resolution.240 In the alternative, COGA asserted that the local 
law “materially impede[d] or destroy[ed] . . . [the] state[‘s] 
interest” underlying Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act 
because the local law prohibited fracking while the state 
permitted it.241 
 Longmont did not contest COGA’s “authority to regulate 
hydraulic fracturing . . . [or] that the Commission is charged with 
fostering production ‘in a manner consistent with protection of 
public health, safety and welfare, including protection of the 
environment and wildlife resources.’”242 Instead, Longmont 
                                                             
236. Id. at 9. 
237. LONGMONT, CO., ORDINANCE art. XVI, § 16.3 (2012). 
238. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-106(2)(a) (West 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
239. Id. § 34-60-106(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
240. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *9 (listing 
Colorado’s general argument). 
241. Id at *8.  
242 Id. at *11. 
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Judge Mallard of Boulder County District Court agreed 
with COGA and concluded that “[t]here is no way to harmonize 
Longmont's fracking ban with the stated goals of the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act, . . . [and] the conflict in this case is an 
irreconcilable conflict.”244 Thus, the court granted COGA’s initial 
motion for summary judgment, but the court also stayed the 
order while Longmont considers an appeal, which is likely.245 
 
D. State and Energy Companies’ Interests and Arguments 
Are the Same 
 
The energy companies and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania in the preemption cases listed above seek the same 
result. They do not want any municipal restrictions on fracking 
that exceed state limitations.246 The energy companies and 
Pennsylvania do not want any local fracking regulations that 
conflict with each state’s existing oil and gas regulatory regime.247  
 Pennsylvania and the energy companies want to minimize 
local restrictions because more regulation typically makes it 
harder to reap the benefits of fracking. A complete ban on 
fracking would limit natural gas and oil production, limit job 
growth related to fracking, limit reductions in home gas 
                                                             
243.  Id. 
244. Id. at *13. 
245.  See id. (explaining the ruling and potential future litigation).  
246. See id. at *8–9; Norse Energy Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 964 
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy 
Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 97–100 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); Robinson Twp. v. 
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957; Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. The City of 
Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5–6 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 
2011) (noting the outcome against the municipalities is the same across the 
cases). 
247. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9; Norse 
Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719; State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100; 
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957; Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 
(describing the desires of the states and energy companies generally). 
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expenses, and limit state tax revenue.248 Additional permitting 
processes and more stringent requirements on the fracking 
process at a municipal level could also discourage companies from 
drilling within the municipality or state because those 
restrictions likely make the whole process longer and more costly.  
 The basic argument that the energy companies and 
Pennsylvania used is the same.249 Each contended that the oil 
and gas regulations at the state level preempted the more 
restrictive municipal laws.250 Each asserted that the municipal 
regulations conflicted with the state laws, and thus, the 
municipal laws should be invalidated.251 How the local laws 
conflicted with the state regulations varied based on the wording 
and legislative history of each states’ and municipalities’ laws, 
but generally the conflict boiled down to Pennsylvania and the 
energy companies believing that the wording and the history of 
their respective state statutes created a comprehensive 
                                                             
248. See Section II.B.2 (discussing the positive consequences of 
fracking). 
249. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing 
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964 
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state 
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the 
locality could not enforce its regulations because the state’s regulations took 
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a 
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was 
the one who held authority to do so). 
250. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing 
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964 
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state 
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the 
locality could not enforce its regulations because the state’s regulations took 
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a 
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was 
the one who held authority to do so). 
251. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing 
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964 
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state 
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the 
locality could not enforce its regulations because the state’s regulations took 
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a 
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was 
the one who held authority to do so). 
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regulatory system or granted the state sole regulatory authority 
and thus every state law preempted any municipal regulatory 
attempt.252  
 
E. Municipalities’ Interests and Arguments Are the Same 
 
 The municipalities involved in the preemption cases listed 
above all seek the same result, which is to have their local 
fracking restrictions remain valid.253 Most of the municipalities 
desire outright fracking bans, and one advocated for a lengthier 
pre-drilling registration process.254 The municipalities try to 
impose these restrictions because of alleged potential negative 
consequences associated with fracking: chemical spills, chemical 
fires, seismic activity, and groundwater contamination among 
others.255 
While none of those negative repercussions definitely will 
occur, the municipalities would rather minimize the possibility of 
injury to their environment and citizenry. In enacting these 
restrictions, the municipalities appear to be invoking the 
precautionary principle, an international environmental law 
concept, because they, like countries around the world, “recognize 
                                                             
252. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (stating the argument is 
that authority should be given to the governing state body, rather than the 
municipality). 
253. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing 
that the municipality wishes to maintain their fracking regulations); Norse 
Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the municipality already has 
regulations in place); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (stating that, 
despite the state’s regulations, the locality should be able to regulate as well); 
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (noting the municipality’s desire to regulate 
fracking as well); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 (contending 
that the locality should be able to keep their fracking regulations in place). 
254. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing 
for an outright fracking ban); Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (arguing for an 
outright fracking ban); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing for 
a lengthier pre-drilling registration process); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 
(arguing for an outright fracking ban); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, 
at *5-6 (arguing for an outright fracking ban). 
255. See supra Part II.B.1 (listing the negative effects the 
municipalities want to avoid). 
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as a matter of . . . law that it is preferable to prevent pollution 
than to deal with pollution after it has occurred.”256   
 All the municipalities utilized the same basic argument in 
court.257 The municipalities contended that their respective state 
statutes did not preempt their local ordinances.258 The 
municipalities asserted that each was granted power by the state 
to adopt ordinances concerning local issues, and fracking was an 
issue of local concern.259 Each supported its local concern theory 
by arguing that the potential harms associated with fracking 
would affect its citizenry and its environment, and thus, each city 
or town should be able to use its power of self-governance to 
restrict fracking in order to protect its environment and 
residents.260 
 
F. State and Energy Companies’ Argument Should Prevail 
 
 As seen above, state courts have split fairly evenly on the 
preemption litigation thus far.261 West Virginia, Ohio, and 
Colorado’s courts sided with the energy companies in their cases 
and invalidated local fracking bans on preemption grounds.262 
Pennsylvania and New York’s courts sided with the 
                                                             
256. James E. Hickey Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the 
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
423, 423 (1995). 
257. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing 
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964 
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state 
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the 
locality could not enforce it’s regulations because the state’s regulations took 
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a 
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was 
the one who held authority to do so). 
258. See Goho, supra note 19, at 3 (noting the localities’ basic 
argument). 
259. See id. at 3 (elaborating on each municipality choosing to 
argue that they were granted powers by state constitutions). 
260. See id. at 3–5 (discussing the specific power granted to the 
municipalities by their state constitutions). 
261. See id. at 6 (concluding that states have mixed results on 
fracking bans). 
262. See id. (showing which states invalidated local fracking bans).  
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municipalities in their cases.263 But the preemption litigation in 
Ohio and Colorado is not yet completed because the Ohio case is 
up on appeal and the recent Colorado district court ruling will 
likely be appealed 264  
 The upcoming final phases of preemption litigation should 
likely result in victories for the energy companies and state 
governments rather than the municipalities. Although the state 
and municipal legislatures each weigh the positive and negative 
consequences when enacting laws, it is not the court’s job to take 
those policy concerns under consideration. The courts should 
focus on the constitutional preemption issue and conclude that 
each state’s regulatory restrictions preempt the municipal 
regulations. 
Munroe Falls, Ohio and Dryden, New York both cited 
their state-granted municipal home-rule powers as evidence they 
should have the power to regulate fracking because fracking can 
have an effect on the municipality.265 Longmont, Colorado will 
likely make the same home-rule power argument as Munroe 
Falls and Dryden, if the case moves to the appeals court level.  
But the home-rule powers granted in Ohio declare 
“[m]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of 
local self-government . . . as are not in conflict with general 
laws[,]” and “general laws” refers to state statutes.266 Ohio’s state 
oil and gas regulation explicitly grants the state sole oil and gas 
regulatory power.267 Thus, Munroe Falls’ municipal law conflicts 
with the state statute and is impliedly preempted.268 Ohio’s 
                                                             
263. See id. (discussing which states allowed municipal fracking 
bans).  
264. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 8–
9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. July 24, 2014); Norse Energy Corp. USA v. 
Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); State ex rel. 
Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 97–100 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); 
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957; Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. 
City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 (describing the 
future litigation certain to occur). 
265. See Norse Energy Corp., 964 N.Y.S.2d at 723; State ex rel. 
Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97 (explaining both cities preemption arguments). 
266. John Martinez, 1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4:7 (2013). 
267. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013) (explaining the 
division of oil and gas resources management). 
268. See id. § 4:13 (discussing how implied preemption differs from 
express preemption). 
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Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of its lower appeals 
court and rule in favor of Beck.269  
The stated goals of the Act and the ban are mutually 
exclusive, and thus an irreconcilable conflict exists between the 
state’s Act and Longmont’s ban.270 If Longmont appeals the 
district court’s order, the appeals court should follow the 
reasoning of Judge Mallard and affirm the order. 
 
G. Increased Federal Regulation is the Answer 
 
 This Note has shown how convoluted the existing three-
prong regulatory system is and how it causes significant issues 
for the nation, the states, citizens, and businesses.271 While some 
legal scholars propose increasing local government control,272 
most present plans that focus on increasing federal regulatory 
power.273 Although the creation of a comprehensive federal 
regulatory regime for fracking would likely be arduous, onerous, 
and costly, many believe it is much needed.274  
It would be near impossible to describe every federal 
fracking regulation scheme put forward, but generally there are 
two types of proposals: a fully federally regulated “one-size fits 
all” model or an enhanced federal regulatory standard with some 
minimal, yet necessary, state regulation “cooperative federalism” 
model.275 The one-size fits all model has advantages including 
                                                             
269. See State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97 (outlining why 
future Ohio litigation should follow Ohio precedent). 
270. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-106(2)(a) (West 2013) 
(listing the Colorado Oil and Gas Conversation Commission’s regulatory power). 
271. See Goho, supra note 19 (explaining the intricacy of the 
existing fracking regulatory regime). 
272. See Rachel A. Kitze, Moving Past Preemption: Enhancing the 
Power of Local Governments Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 385, 
412–13 (2013) (noting a proposed regulatory scheme seeking to empower local 
governments more so than the existing regulatory scheme). 
273. See Gerken, supra note 89, at 128 (describing a potential 
regulatory scheme focused on the federal government setting the standards for 
the fracking industry). 
274. See id. (explaining how a cooperative federal regulatory regime 
is one possible answer to fracking’s existing regulatory issues). 
275. See Saby Ghoshray, Charting the Future Trajectory for 
Fracking Regulation: From Environmental Democracy to Cooperative 
Federalism, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 199, 233–37 (outlining the basic future 
fracking regulatory models). 
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having centralized governing bodies that would have sole 
regulatory control, likely the EPA or the DOE, and being less 
redundant and costly, which could arise from state and federal 
bodies performing the same work in a cooperative regulatory 
regime.276 But most legal scholars believe the disadvantages of 
the one-size fits all model, including the lack of understanding 
about each state’s local geography and economic situation, 
outweigh the advantages.277 
Most legal scholars champion the cooperative federalism 
model because it enhances federal power while leaving the states 
some individualized control.278 The cooperative federalism model 
would allow federal agencies to create comprehensive mandatory 
standards for every aspect of the fracking process.279 The 
mandatory standards would serve as minimums for the states to 
follow, but the states, because of their specific geographical, 
economic, and societal nuances, could impose more stringent 




 All of the courts currently hearing fracking preemption 
cases should rule that the respective state laws regulating oil and 
gas exploration preempt the local fracking ban. The 
municipalities that ban fracking cite their home-rule powers as 
support for their local regulations, but all of the municipal home-
rule powers currently before the courts have a caveat that ruins 
the cities’ arguments. The home-rule powers only allow municipal 
laws that are not inconsistent with state law, and all of the local 
regulations are inconsistent with their respective state laws.  
Thus, if fracking grows in the future and occurs in states 
without fracking regulations, future state fracking laws should be 
                                                             
276. See id. at 237 (describing the advantages of a solely federally 
regulated fracking industry). 
277. See id. (discussing disadvantages outweighing the potential 
advantages of fracking). 
278. See id. (explaining the disadvantages of the one-size fits all 
federal regulation plan). 
279. See id. (noting the increased comprehensive power of the 
federal government). 
280. See id. (describing how a cooperative federalism regulatory 
scheme would work in practice). 
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clear and explain that the state has sole and exclusive authority 
to regulate the industry and has a comprehensive regulatory 
regime in place. Then, if a municipality fights back, bans 
fracking, and litigation arises, the state should win the 
preemption case because a municipality banning fracking clearly 
contradicts a state law granting the state all regulatory power.  
As seen through this Note, the existing regulatory regime 
is convoluted, complex, and costly. Politicians have a chance to do 
the right thing right now and end any future preemption 
litigation before it begins by creating the new regulatory regime 
that legal scholars call for.281 A regulatory scheme that would 
enhance the federal government’s regulatory power, reduces the 
states’ regulatory authority, and eliminates any local regulatory 
authority.282 This mainly centralized regulatory system would 
drastically reduce redundancy and costs and would eliminate 
potential preemption litigation. 
                                                             
281. See id. (noting the most frequently proposed and lauded 
alternative regulatory system).  
282. See id. (explaining how much regulatory power each level of 
government would have in this alternative regulatory regime). 
